# UNITE

OR

# FALL.

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# UNITE OR FALL.

GREAT Induſtry having been employed to perſuade the people of England, that the preſent war could, by better management, have been avoided, and an additional weight of uneaſineſs being thus laid on the public mind, eaſily irritated under the preſſure of heavy taxes, however evidently impoſed for the general preſervation, it ſhall be my endeavour to ſhow, *that the War from the beginning was unavoidable; that we were not the original aggreſſors; that no miniſters could have kept upon terms of friendſhip with France, without injury to their country; and that peace, notwithſtanding two attempts on the part of Great*

*Britain to procure it, has hitherto been unattainable.* The vexation therefore juſt alluded to ought not only to be diſmiſſed as groundleſs, but alſo as highly miſchievous at this moment, in as much as it tends to weaken that exertion, which, reſulting from *union* eſtabliſhes our ſecurity; but which, if palſied by party accuſations, and unfounded clamours, ſo calculated to ſow diviſion, would almoſt juſtify the enemy in his wildeſt projects to deſtroy us.

The firſt point then for conſideration, is, whether there is any ground for the opinion which ſome perſons have propagated, that it was practicable to have kept out of the war, by preſerving, [to uſe their own phraſe] *a dignified Neutrality.*

It muſt be remarked, that the obligations we were under to ſupport our Allies when attacked made it ſomewhat difficult to turn to this notable expedient: for, unfortunately, one of our Allies was wantonly attacked by France, and the only contrivance

trivance we could uſe to eſcape from ſo inconvenient an engagement was indeed a ſimple one; viz. to break it. But the advocates for this *dignified Neutrality*, men ſo prodigal of the national honour, ſo laviſh of its good faith, ſo much concerned for its dignity, ought, I apprehend, to be able to ſhow that we conſulted at leaſt *our intereſt*, when we called in the aid of this flexible morality, to extricate ourſelves from the performance of our promiſes ſolemnly made to Holland.

Another circumſtance occurred, which, if not ſufficiently ſtrong, according to the ideas of ſome politicians, to place arms in our hands, was ſufficiently alarming to make it prudent to have them within our reach. This was a certain declared offer of France, addreſſed to all nations who had a wiſh to change their form of Government, engaging to afford them every aſſiſtance to effect that change. I am ſenſible it was ſaid, and I dare ſay will be repeated, that ſuch a rodomontade declaration ſhould have affected us but

ſlightly, and had better been met by the pride of contemptuous ſilence. This conduct might have poſſibly been as dignified as the neutrality ſo much recommended; but it cannot be forgotten, that we were adviſed thus to treat this outrageous declaration, at the very moment when the enemies of this, and I conceive of all Governments, did appear a little more out of their hiding places than they think it ſafe for them to do at preſent; when every art was employed to miſlead the underſtanding of the people; when a moſt alarming panic had ſeized upon the beſt friends to order, and eſtabliſhed rule; when the ſea was open every tide to waft over more ingenious and more effective diſſeminators of Revolutionary poiſon, and when we had not that Bulwark of ſafety to reſort to, the power of circumventing theſe contrivers of our ruin by the operation of the Alien Bill. When all this is recollected, one may at leaſt be permitted to doubt the wiſe policy of endeavouring to entrench ourſelves upon this dignified neutrality, a poſition of honour

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which was to be gained by an avowed infraction of ſolemn compacts into which we had entered; a bright ſtation claiming reverence and admiration; aſcended to by the groſſeſt perfidy, and deſertion of our friends.

But grant that, under all theſe circumſtances, we had yielded to the advice of thoſe who would have endeavoured to have kept out of the war. On the one hand we have *their* aſſurances that this conduct would have inſured our eaſe and ſafety; but alas! on the other, we have the example of America, to prove how viſionary was ſuch an expectation.

America, not the ſtanding object, like Great Britain, which France, ever ſince the unforgiven peace of 1763, had directed all her ability to injure and degrade, feeling the full value of peace, and knowing how peculiarly neceſſary was the continuance of that bleſſing to the rapid progreſs ſhe was hourly making to opulence and

conſequence; not thinking ſhe was included (being not a Monarchical State) in that aſtoniſhing promiſe of aid above mentioned; under no difficulty as to treaties with the neighbouring nations of the French Republic; America, I ſay, took no part in the diſputes of Europe, but anchored herſelf upon the plain and ſtrong ground of performing her duties to the reſt of the world, under the juſt and admitted explanation of the law of nations.

We are now to examine whether this mild and equitable conduct did preſerve her from intolerable inſult and oppreſſion, or whether it will in the end ſecure her from war.

Long before the rupture between France and England, the whole induſtry of France was employed to bring America into her hoſtile views againſt this country; to force her out of her pacific ſyſtem, and to make common cauſe with the Republic. When America

America preſumed to perſevere in that ſyſtem apparently moſt conducive to her intereſt, and, in her judgment, moſt applicable to her condition, ſhe was inſultingly told by the French agents, that her Government did not comprehend her real ſituation; and a menace was actually made by Monſieur Genet to appeal from that eſtabliſhed Government to the people at large; and, in fact, the whole tenour of that Miniſter's inſtructions, as publiſhed by himſelf in 1793, was to effect a union of force with the Republic, in her operations againſt Great Britain.

This man's inſolence went to the height of threatening to make a formal complaint againſt the preſident for refuſing to convene congreſs at his inſtance. Every art was uſed by him and his ſucceſſor, to drive the Americans from their neutrality, upbraiding them, in the moſt offenſive terms, with their ingratitude to thoſe, who, theſe agents moſt haughtily, but falſely aſſerted, had

conferred independence upon the United States; treating with deriſion all obligations to other nations, "growing," to uſe their own words, "out of the worm-eaten "volumes of Grotius and Puffendorf," and not out of the new enlightening ſyſtem of reaſon and juſtice; of which reaſon and juſtice, it is curious to obſerve, France reſerved to herſelf the ſole right of judging.

America, ſtill feeling all the conſequence of peace, was calm and temperate in her remonſtrances againſt this outrageous treatment; but, at the ſame time, gave France no hope that ſhe would make over to her the right or power of deciding upon her eſſential intereſts. France, to the greateſt degree exaſperated and diſappointed that ſhe could not make America the dupe of her deſigns, and miniſter to her revenge againſt Great Britain, has actually made the threatened appeal to the people againſt the Government, declared the treaty between the two countries at an end, permitted her ſhips to plunder thoſe of the

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United States; ſent away the American Miniſter, and has told that country, when it ſhall reſtore its Government to its *true principles* (France again being the ſole judge) it ſhall be ſuffered to return to its former condition of friend and ally.

As for thoſe amongſt us who ſtill contend that Great Britain was the aggreſſor in the war, and who inſinuate that, had their advice been liſtened to, peace would not have been interrupted, they muſt (in candour I ſuppoſe it) have been unacquainted with the facts now expoſed, as well as with ſome others even more neceſſary to be obſerved upon.

Whoever turns to the reaſons aſſigned by France for declaring war againſt Auſtria, will be convinced, that none of thoſe reaſons really actuated her to adopt hoſtile meaſures, but that her conduct on that occaſion made part of that ſyſtem avowed by ſo many, and ſo happily explained by the celebrated Briſſot and Camille Deſmoulins.

One of theſe worthies declares, that "*We (the French) muſt ſet fire to the four corners of the world;*" the other, that to "*diſorganize Europe was one of the ſublime vocations of the Convention.*" But if this truth appears not upon the face of the publiſhed manifeſtoes, the Briſſotine party in the Convention, charge it to the king as a crime, his reluctance to fall upon Auſtria, and ever afterwards take the credit to themſelves of having forced him to that meaſure.

In regard to England, the queſtion of aggreſſion is ſtill, if poſſible, more clear.

It was made a regular charge againſt Briſſot, at his trial, that he unneceſſarily occaſioned a rupture between France and England. He denies that he was the individual promoter of the war, but maintains that Robeſpierre was the ſole author of it. Would it not have ſerved his juſtification as well, to have ſhewn, had that been poſſible, that England was the aggreſſor?

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Every body can recollect, it was in Jan. 1793, that Monſieur Chauvelin was ordered to depart this country, and how much ground of accuſation and blame was afforded to the oppoſers of the war, in conſequence of that ſtep taken by his Majeſty's Miniſters. But it is a curious fact, that ſo early as 1792, the Convention had ordered a formidable naval equipment, with the avowed expectation of a war with the maritime powers. What maritime powers, the reader will determine. But it is ſtill more important, when we are blamed for not having been lulled by M. Chauvelin's pacific aſſurances, that *the inſtructions had actually been ſigned at Paris*, nine days before his departure from this country, and tranſmitted to Mr. Genet, the French agent in America, ordering him to move heaven and earth to engage America againſt Great Britain, to break her treaty, to ſet aſide all reſtrictions under the Law of nations, to compel Great Britain to relinquiſh rights, which America had repeatedly acknowledged

Great

Great Britain, according to that law, to poſſeſs, and which could only have been done by appealing to the ſword; to which point France moſt ardently wiſhed to drive her.*

There are thoſe who ſtill catch at every thing that ſupports for a moment a cenſure of Adminiſtration, though the next moment ſhould detect its fallacy, and who, therefore, reſt upon the *declarations* of France, and not upon her *actions*. And, which is more whimſical, when declaration is at variance with declaration, they incline to that which correſponds the leaſt with the ſyſtem which

* If the reader wiſhes fuller information on points relating to America, he is deſired to peruſe Mr. Harper's very able pamphlet; in which he will find many of the facts and tranſactions, here briefly noticed, amply and much more ſatisfactorily ſtated. The writer would not have preſumed to have compreſſed thoſe facts and tranſactions, already exhibited to ſuch great advantage, had he not been apprehenſive, that the ſize of that pamphlet, and its ſubject matter not *appearing* to relate particularly to Great Britain, might have impeded the circulation of much uſeful information to Engliſhmen, as well as Americans.

is evidently to be traced through all her conduct. For inſtance, the Convention makes an unqualified offer of aid *to all* who are willing to alter their forms of Government. When England takes alarm at this, it again delares, it has no intention to diſturb fixed governments, but offers aſſiſtance, when a whole people ſhall call for aſſiſtance; as if a whole people could require any. But this ſecond declaration better accommodates ſome perſons, though they know a correſpondence was actually held between the Revolutioniſts of France, and a part (thank God, a ſmall part) of his Majeſty's ſubjects; that open encouragement was held out to this ſmall part; and that perſons acting as deputies, had formal audiences of the French Convention. Yet we are to accept the ſecond declaration, that nothing was more remote from their wiſhes or deſigns than to diſturb ſettled Governments.

If the oppoſers of the war had contented themſelves with ſtating how little the preciſe

ciſe moment, in which Great Britain commenced hoſtilities, was ſuitable to the views of France, and that the infraction of the peace, at that inſtant, was by her neither deſired nor expected, they would doubtleſs be nearer the truth; but this would have afforded no ground for thoſe inceſſant railings about the wanton cruelty and inexpediency of the war.

France had then certainly upon her hands more than ſhe ſeemed equal to manage: for, breaking with the neighbouring continental powers, it would, no doubt, have been very convenient to her, had we ſlept till ſhe could have been leſs engaged, and prepared to turn to us with more certainty of injuring, if not deſtroying us; till ſhe could have put her marine in a better condition, by tempting back the emigrant captains of her navy, the loſs of whom ſhe moſt ſeverely felt; till ſhe had made ſome impreſſion againſt us with America; till, by breaking through all our treaties, we ſhould have been found without a friend; till the ſeeds of

anarchy

anarchy and confuſion, diſperſed by her kind hand, ſhould have promiſed an immediate harveſt; and, laſtly, till, through fear of giving offence, and of diminiſhing the advantages of our *dignified neutrality*, we ſhould have been found totally unprepared for reſiſtance.

But we ſhall be told, that the intended neutrality would have ſecured the country from any hoſtile attempts of France, as it was not incompatible with preparation for defence. To this I anſwer, ſuch preparation would have been *war*; or, to avoid it, a ſubmiſſion to an order to *deſiſt*. America, not the object of her long and conſtant jealouſy, cannot, with all its temperate efforts, keep up, with that domineering power, the relations of amity, without ſubmitting to its will, or being dictated to as a conquered province.

What hope could we have rationally entertained, of warding off, beyond a ſhort period, the effects of that vengeance, which

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is to be ſo clearly diſcovered in every part of Monſieur Genet's inſtructions; a vengeance, the gratification of which, ever ſince the peace of 1763, has been the declared and ruling paſſion of France. A little delay of the meditated blow might perhaps, have been purchaſed by an humiliating avowal and manifeſtation of perfect weakneſs; and, in that caſe, it would have become a fair ſpeculation of the French Republic, whether or not the unreſiſted power of revolutionary principles, making their ſteady way through the country, might not altogether have prevented the trouble of employing an army or a navy to complete the work.

If little doubt remains as to the point of aggreſſion, ſtill leſs will attend the examination, "which power was reſolved to continue, which to terminate the conteſt."

The temperate and able conduct of Lord Malmeſbury under his inſtructions, brought

brought this country and the French Republic, in both negociations, before the great tribunal of the world, in order to its deciſion, which nation was ſincere in its attempts at peace, and which was ſyſtematically bent on war. In the firſt inſtance, France, baffled at every turn by an evident and prompt acquieſcence on our part, to meet her upon any reaſonable ground of diſcuſſion and arrangement, was reduced to the extravagance of demanding to know the whole extent of Lord Malmesbury's powers, the ultimatum, the points upon which he was to inſiſt, and thoſe upon which, under certain circumſtances, he might relax. This unprecedented inſpection was claimed, without the offer on their part of a ſhadow of ſimilar information. This advantage in the negociation was to be balanced by no reciprocal benefit; and it would be affronting to common ſenſe to ſuppoſe that a demand ſo outrageous, ſo contrary to all the uſages of civilized nations, could have been made, but for the purpoſe of being rejected. The wolf

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in the fable was not more put to it for excuſes for eating the lamb, than France was, to break off the negociation, nor betrayed a clearer determination, how the buſineſs ſhould end.

The ſecond attempt at Liſle, ſeemed to commence under better auſpices. There were certainly at that time in France, perſons of weight and authority, who felt the mutual advantage which both countries could not fail to derive from the reeſtabliſhment of peace. The reward of this humane ſentiment, was an immediate baniſhment without trial, to the unwholeſome regions of Cayenne. With the expulſion of Monſieur Barthelemy, &c. the hope of reſtoring the public tranquility was much abated. But ſtill the temperate conduct of Great Britain again made the whole world competent to decide upon the ſincerity and real views of both nations. Again might the conduct of France be exemplified by the ſame fable. Finding no other expedient to break off the negociation,

tion, ſhe bluntly aſked for a ſurrender, on our part, of all our conqueſts. What was to be the return from *her?*—Nothing. But when aſked, if ſuch a ſurrender were poſſible, would that be *peace*? the anſwer was *No:* we merely accept this preliminary as a baſis, from which to riſe to topics of the moſt ſerious importance. So that the reaſonableneſs of a ſurrender of all we had gained was to a degree to be admitted, to purchaſe the permiſſion of advancing to points of important diſcuſſion; and the conſequence of breaking off upon thoſe ſubſequent topics, (which probably would have been the caſe, from the diſpoſition manifeſted by the Directory) would have been embarraſſing the future approach to peace with the avowal, that the demand of the ſurrender alluded to, had been admitted as a baſis of negociation.

From the above premiſes, the following deductions appear naturally to flow:

*That*

*That*, by the confeſſion of France herſelf, ſhe was the aggreſſor in the war;

*That*, with all our care, and debaſing ourſelves to the utmoſt, by the endurance of inſults as difficult to ſubmit to as thoſe offered to America, all we were likely to have obtained, would have been ſome ſuſpenſion of our fate, or, as Dr. Swift expreſſes it, "the humble favour of being "laſt devoured;"

*And that*, in both attempts made to reſtore peace, France has evinced, in the cleareſt manner, her determined reſolution to continue the war.

Under this conviction, what have we to do, but to avoid ſpending our time in unprofitable talk, and to unite in one ſolid and general ſyſtem of defence. It is true, there has been in this conflict, a great expenditure of public treaſure. It is alſo true, and it is a more lamentable truth, that there has

has been a ſad effuſion of human blood. But we have ſtill a Conſtitution to protect, which has hitherto, with all its alledged imperfections, beſtowed more happineſs and real liberty, than ever an indulgent Providence has elſewhere permited men to enjoy.—We are ſtill in poſſeſſion of our property: we do not deſpair that this property will reach our children.—We have a King upon the Throne, who, from the day he was ſeated there to this moment, has enjoyed and merited the confidence and love of his people: we will not ſuffer Him without a ſtruggle, to be driven from it.—We have ſtill the Altar of our Religion to reſort to, unpolluted by the blood of its prieſts: we will not tamely ſee it caſt down, and trampled on; nor will we procure a momentary pauſe to our ſufferings in this world, by embracing ATHEISM and abjuring our GOD.

THE END.

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